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Abstract
We analyse how spatial disparities in innovation activities, coupled with migration
costs, affect economic geography, market structure, growth and regional inequality.
We provide conditions for existence and uniqueness of a spatial equilibrium, and
for the endogenous emergence of industry clusters. Spatial variations in knowledge
spillovers lead to spatial concentration of more innovative firms. Migration costs,
however, limit the concentration of economic activities in the most productive region.
Narrowing the gap in knowledge spillovers across regions raises growth, and reduces
regional inequality by making firms more sensitive to wage differentials. The associ-
ated change in the industry concentration has positive welfare effects.
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1. Introduction
Firm market power has increased across all sectors in the US, as recently documented by
De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018), with the rise in mark-ups mainly driven by few firms
concentrated in the upper tail, and market shares moving from low to high mark-up firms
(except for the retail industry). This trend is most evident in dynamic industries where in-
novation is increasing.1 In terms of location, innovative activities in most countries are
concentrated in few productive regions. One of the primary reasons why innovation tends
to cluster spatially is that knowledge spillovers are stronger in specific places. The link be-
tween innovation and the spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers has received signifi-
cant attention in economics and economic geography (see Feldman and Kogler (2010)).
Less attention has been paid to the role played by localised knowledge externalities on the
transmission of innovation on market structure, the dynamics of competition and growth.
The research question we consider is: How are regional disparities2 in innovation activities
shaping the geography of the economy, its market structure, the growth rate and inter-regional
1 Most R&D intensive activities, such as ICT, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, and automobiles are concen-
trated in few companies. For instance, the 2018 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard shows that in coun-
tries like Germany, France, Japan and the US the top 100 companies account for half of R&D spending.
2 Our use of the term “regional/spatial disparities” differs from the traditional way it is used in the field of econom-
ic geography. We refer to spatial disparities as relating to innovation activities and differences in technology. In
contrast, in the majority of the economic geography field “spatial disparities” refers to disparities in income dif-
ferences and inequality refers to (income) differences among households.
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inequality? We investigate this question within a setup which encompasses industry location
and R&D-led growth with three distinctive features: (i) an endogenous market structure char-
acterised by oligopolistic firms conducting R&D, (ii) spatially constrained knowledge flows
and (iii) migration costs. We find that a reduced knowledge spillover deficit across regions
leads to higher growth, reduced inter-regional inequality, and overall higher welfare.
We depart from the existing literature in three ways. Firstly, innovation clusters and re-
gional disparities emerge endogenously, hence relating industry concentration and growth.
Secondly, we can explain dispersed innovation activity without relying on transport (or
congestion) costs, hence emphasising frictions in knowledge flows as the source of ag-
glomeration economies. Thirdly, dispersion is robust to the possibility of migration.
The spatial disparities in technology (knowledge) spillovers encourage the spatial concen-
tration of industries in the most productive region, however, inter-regional migration costs
limit the geographical concentration of economic activities. As a result, not all firms necessar-
ily operate in the most productive region. The oligopolistic (Cournot) market structure gener-
ates a positive relationship between concentration and market power, with the implication
that the spatial concentration of industries is associated with fewer, but more R&D intensive,
firms. Individuals endogenously choose their location, implying that the share of population
in each region is affected by asymmetries in knowledge externalities across regions.
We find that higher knowledge spillovers increase Lao’s demand in R&D, which in turn
increases R&D costs (and, thereby, the entry level of R&D), leading to a reduction in the
number of operating firms, and a higher mark-up. In equilibrium, the economy has fewer
but more productive firms; it has a higher growth rate, and this effect is more pronounced
for the lagging region. Intuitively, since labour costs are higher in the advanced region,
more firms set up operation in the lagging region when knowledge spillovers increase,
than in the advanced region for an equivalent increase in knowledge spillovers there. In
this case, regional disparities in innovation clusters (and income) can also be reduced.
Welfare in each region depends on static components related to market imperfection and
the relative wage, and on dynamic components associated with the rate of growth. We
show that the growth gains associated with fewer and more productive firms outweigh the
static losses associated with a lower degree of competitiveness (higher prices).
Furthermore, we show that, under mild parameter restrictions, both regions experience
welfare gains as spillovers in the lagging region strengthen. In essence, reducing regional
disparities and promoting growth can be mutually compatible.
We provide novel insights on the role played by localised knowledge externalities on
the emergence of regional disparities in innovation clusters, industry concentration and
growth. The ability of advanced regions to better capture knowledge and ideas translates
into more labour allocated to R&D, higher wages, higher productivity and higher spatial
concentration of industry. The latter, in turn, influences the industry market power and the
associated R&D and innovation activities. This prediction is consistent with empirical evi-
dence, and deserves further exploration.3 Compared to monopolistic competition models
3 Recent work by Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2018) studies whether the positive trend in product market concentration,
observed at the national level, persists at the local market level. They document heterogeneous trends across
industries, with diverging trends prevailing in the retail industry, while in the manufacturing industry they ob-
serve mainly rising concentration both at the national and local level. The key mechanism behind the divergent
trends in some industries rests on large enterprises opening up more plants in new local markets, thereby expand-
ing the local number of establishments in the industry. This occurs particularly in sectors where transport costs
are relevant (e.g. retail). Their results, therefore, do not contradict ours, which focus on R&D intensive (manufac-
turing) activities and negligible transportation costs.
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with endogenous mark ups due to variable demand elasticities, we focus on models that
generate higher market concentration and a rise in mark ups.
Our results also have potentially interesting implications for policy. Particularly, which
type of intervention facilitates knowledge spillovers on local economies and a realignment
in the spatial disparities in innovation activities across regions. One natural candidate would
be to implement place-based university/educational policies. Empirical evidence indicates a
casual link between university research activity and productivity in neighbouring firms, as
exposure to research and inventors facilitate innovation (Jaffe (1989); Kantor and Whalley
(2014)). Going a step further, lagging regions may also need new policies aimed at increas-
ing exposure to innovation during childhood, as new evidence shows that more exposure to
inventors and innovation in early life is key to increased innovation Bell et al. (2019).4
Throughout the paper we concentrate on spillovers across regions rather than techno-
logical gaps (or absorptive capacity). Notwithstanding, our work naturally extends to
economies not lying on the technological frontier. 5Finally, we discuss how our model
may be extended to allow for population growth and firm heterogeneity. Specifically, firms
belonging to a given sector are identical, while firm productivity differs across sectors. As
a result, average knowledge between regions differs, mitigating the scale of firm relocation
and inter-regional income and utility changes associated with a reduction in the gap in
knowledge spillovers between regions.
Relation to the literature
The literature, pioneered by Krugman (1991), and further developed by the new economic
geography discipline (Fujita et al. (1999); Martin and Ottaviano (1999); Ottaviano and
Robert-Nicoud (2005)), has traditionally focused on spatial frictions to account for the spa-
tial distribution of industries and the geography of economic activity. Yet, localisation per-
sists despite the rapid decline in the costs of shipping goods and in communication costs
(Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004); Head and Mayer (2004)). Alternative explanations, empha-
sising knowledge diffusion and learning, may be as relevant in accounting for clustering
of innovation activities (Audretsch and Feldman (2004)). Regional variations in localised
knowledge spillovers have been identified in the empirical literature since the seminal
work of Jaffe et al. (1993), lately revitalised by Thompson and Fox-Kean (2005). Notably,
it is the non-codified (tacit) type of knowledge that flows more easily locally than over
great distances (Gertler (2003)). This is the type of knowledge that is transferred through
person-to-person interaction and is clearly facilitated by geographic proximity and hin-
dered by the costs of people moving (Combes and Duranton (2006)). Recent work by
Bloom et al. (2013), estimate that the social return to R&D is two to three times higher
than the private return. Building on Bloom et al. (2013); Lychagin et al. (2016) find that
both intra- and inter-regional spillovers matter. Furthermore, they find empirical support
for the hypothesis that reduced face-to-face knowledge flows account for the weakening
of cross-regional spillovers in space. This evidence also fits with a vast body of literature
4 Focusing on the geography of innovation, Bell et al. (2019) show that direct exposure to a culture of invention
and to role models appears to be playing a key role. Crucially, they show that the geographical aspects hold re-
gardless of where you live as an adult, indicating the importance of early exposure. The authors point to the need
to expose young people, especially those who show early-life excellence at math and science, to actual inventors
and their workplaces, by promoting schemes ranging from mentoring by current inventors to internship programs
at local companies
5 In appendix 9.8 we show that incorporating both spillovers and technological gaps would not alter our qualitative
results.
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in the urban and regional economic field, which argues that regional (and urban) units are
increasingly relevant for the advancement of a country, as innovation leads increasingly
rely on knowledge that tends to remain localised (Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009)).
New empirical research on knowledge spillovers, technological diffusion and regional
innovation (Cortinovis and van Oort (2019); Miguélez and Moreno (2015); Caragliu and
Nijkamp (2016)) also stress the importance of absorptive capacity of regions to address
issues related to the impact of knowledge spillovers on innovation activities. Caragliu and
Nijkamp (2016) analyse how various aspects of proximity (such as geography, cognitive,
relational) impact on regional knowledge spillovers, and find that absorptive capacity is
critical for a region to benefit from the knowledge produced in other regions. Miguélez
and Moreno (2015) and Cortinovis and van Oort (2019) support these findings and stress
the importance of networks and spatial mobility. They both emphasise that it takes a critic-
al mass of existing knowledge to capture R&D spillovers. The formal model we propose
borrows insights from this literature by incorporating disparities in the spatial extent of
knowledge externalities, and migration costs, so that the region with the larger knowledge
spillovers is characterised by higher productivity and a higher population share.
The present work is closely related to the literature on endogenous growth and endogen-
ous industry location pioneered by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and subsequently
adopted by the new economic geography literature (Martin and Ottaviano (1999), Baldwin
and Forslid (2000); Martin and Ottaviano (2001); Baldwin et al. (2011)). Grossman and
Helpman (1991) show that, when knowledge spillovers are global, initial conditions deter-
mine the pattern of trade and growth. In their approach, however, there is a single R&D
sector that innovates and each innovation is used to produce a new variety. Hence, innov-
ation takes place only in the country with the larger stock of knowledge capital. In our
setup, in contrast, dispersion of innovation activities can be compatible with regions of dif-
ferent sizes and of, potentially, different knowledge endowments. Building on Grossman
and Helpman (1991), Martin and Ottaviano (1999) consider the role of global and local
R&D spillovers; they show that geography influences productivity only if spillovers are
local and, then, study the effect of lower transport costs on agglomeration and growth.
Rather than assuming one or the other type of spillover, we take into consideration both
the strength and spatial extent of knowledge externalities, and show how regional dispar-
ities in innovation-enhancing activities, rather than transport frictions, can affect both in-
dustry location and growth. Both Baldwin and Forslid (2000); Martin and Ottaviano
(2001), develop growth-and-geography models featuring monopolistic competition, en-
dogenous industrial location and inter-regional migration, with the aim to analyse the spa-
tial evolution of economic activities. Namely, the conditions that support multiple
equilibria and the role played by impediments to trade and factor mobility.6 Compared to
this literature, an added feature of our approach is that the number of firms is endogenous,
allowing us to relate industry concentration and growth.7 We show that reducing the
knowledge spillover deficit across regions may lead to higher growth and more concen-
trated markets. Although the link between market power concentration, innovation and
6 Baldwin et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive overview of this literature.
7 In its basic structure, our model is closely related to the GOLE framework developed by Neary, in that we de-
velop a two-region model (without any competitive numeraire sector) featuring a large number of variety of
goods produced by differentiated sectors with firms competing à la Cournot (see, e.g., Eckel and Neary (2010);
Neary (2016)). In our oligopolistic economy, though, there is endogenous growth and the focus is on how region-
al disparities in innovation activities affect the geography of economic activity and inter-regional inequality, ra-
ther than on the implications of international trade.
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growth is well established in the literature (Aghion and Howitt (1992); Peretto (1996);
Aghion et al. (1997); Etro (2009)), we explicitly consider location as an additional vari-
able, which allows for the endogenous emergence of regional disparities in innovation
clusters. In the paper we also touch upon the issue of scale distortions embedded in the
NEG approach (Bond-Smith (2019)), and extend the model so that the spatial consequen-
ces of innovation are not amplified by scale effects.
Our present contribution also resonates with recent work on spatial economics incorpo-
rating trade costs and labour mobility, where part of the spatial variation in income across
regions is explained by variations in trade costs (Allen and Arkolakis (2014); Desmet
et al. (2018)). Differently from this literature, we focus on the endogenous emergence of
industry clusters, growth and inter-regional inequality. Compared to this literature, our con-
tribution is to show that spatial differences in knowledge externalities (coupled with mi-
gration costs) not only ensure uniqueness and existence of a spatial equilibrium but are
relevant for industry location and growth. Crucially, we are able to explain dispersed in-
novation activity in the presence of no transportation costs.8
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyses
the equilibrium, first conditional on a given population distribution across regions, and
then conditional on individuals’ location choice. Section 4 analyses the effect of know-
ledge spillovers on the patterns of agglomeration, or dispersion, of activities and individu-
als. Section 5 explores the implications for growth and inter-regional income inequality.
Section 6 briefly discusses the role of transport costs, while in Section 7 we look at the
implications of relaxing firm homogeneity and fixed population. Section 8 concludes. All
proofs are presented in the Appendix Table 1 below details the notation (parameters and
variables) used throughout the paper.
2. The Model
We consider a two-region setup (North and South) where the same disembodied form of
technology (e.g., blueprints, intangibles) may be adopted in the whole economy, but one re-
gion is better than the other at capturing outside (non-codified) knowledge. As a result, the
region with the larger knowledge spillovers experiences lower innovation costs and, thereby,
higher productivity. We assume that knowledge is embedded in labour hired and used in
R&D activities. Workers are homogeneous and are used for both R&D as well as the produc-
tion of goods. They are perfectly mobile within a region but imperfectly mobile between
regions. In what follows, we restrict attention to the description of technologies and preferen-
ces in the Northern region. Analogous expressions apply to the Southern region. Whenever a
distinction is needed variables and/or parameters for the South are denoted with a star, *.
Time t is continuous and goes from zero to infinity. The economy as a whole has a con-
stant, exogenous number of identical, infinitely-lived, skilled workers, Lw, each endowed
with one unit of labour-time supplied inelastically.
It is assumed that, at date zero, a share g of individuals are born and reside in the
North, while the remaining share g ¼ 1 g is born and reside in the South.
The labour market is perfectly competitive and workers incur a positive non-pecuniary
cost of migration. The latter accounts, among other things, for the cost of adapting to a
8 Tabuchi et al. (2018) also have migration costs acting as the dispersion force. In their paper, however, the distribu-
tion of activities is determined by the interplay between labour productivity and migration costs; moreover, in their
work, technological progress is exogenous and affects all regions equally. In contrast, we assume that firms’ ability
to capture knowledge differs across regions, and identify knowledge spillovers as an agglomeration force.
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new environment, moving away from friends and family, and similar. As made clear later
on, such a migration cost allows a steady-state equilibrium in which individuals stay put
while firms, responding to shocks, set up operations in one region or the other.
Preferences and technologies are described next. Individuals derive utility from the con-









where aj is a parameter of the taste for variety j; with
PN
j¼1 aj ¼ 1, N> 2 represents the
exogenous set of commodities produced in the whole economy, cj;t is the consumption of
variety j (j ¼ 1; . . . ;N ) and q > 0 is the rate of time preference. To simplify we impose
aj ¼ a ¼ 1=N . Lifetime utility, expression (1), is slightly different from that used in stand-
ard models in the new economic geography literature (NEG). In particular, there is no
homogeneous (agricultural) sector good which can be traded at no cost between regions.9
The budget constraint of an individual residing in the North is given by
Table 1. Notation
Symbol Description
N Number of industrial sectors, j ¼ 1; . . . :;N
Qj Number of firms in each sector j ¼ 1; . . . :;N ; each denoted by qj ¼ 1; . . . ;Qj
aj Parameter of taste for each good j, j ¼ 1; . . . :;N
q Rate of time preference
g Share of total population residing in the North
Lw Total number of individuals/total quantity of labour (NorthþSouth)
sD Intra-regional transportation cost
sI Inter-regional transportation cost
l Degree of inter-regional knowledge spillover in R&D
Et Per-capita level of expenditures
cj;t Consumption of good j, j ¼ 1; . . . ;N
pj;t Price of good j, j ¼ 1; . . . ;N
 Returns to knowledge in the R&D sector
d Productivity parameter in the R&D sector
Aqj ;t Quantity of knowledge produced by a Northern firm qj, qj ¼ 1; . . . :;Qj
Xqj ;t Quantity of good produced by firm qj, qj ¼ 1; . . . :;Qj
LXqj ;t Quantity of labour devoted to the production of good qj, qj ¼ 1; . . . :;Qj
LAqj ;t Quantity of labour devoted to R&D in firm qj, qj ¼ 1; . . . :;Qj
c Endogenous share of sectors located in the North
wt Wage rate in the Northern region
Pqj ;0 Present values of expected profits of firm qj, qj ¼ 1; . . . :;Qj
pqj ;t Time t profits of firm qj, qj ¼ 1; . . . :;Qj
rt Real interest rate
m Individual migration cost
nt Co-state variable associated with the R&D technology in every firm qj, qj ¼ 1; . . . ;Qj; j ¼ 1; . . . :;N
9 In NEG models this is the device used to equalise the wage of (unskilled) individuals in both regions. Another
point of departure with the standard literature is the use of a Cobb-Douglas felicity function instead of a standard
CES form. Such formalisation, however, is made to simplify the analysis. Detailed calculations, available from
the authors upon request, show that none of the results we derive hinge on this specification.

















where Et denotes the per-capita level of expenditure, pj;t (p

j;t) is the price of commodity j
produced in the North (South), sD and sI stand for transport (iceberg) costs, and c repre-
sents the (endogenous) share of industries located in the North. Accordingly, cN is the
number of commodities produced in the North. The upper-bar indicates the consumption
of a good produced in the foreign region (imported good).
The iceberg costs can also be interpreted as capturing the quality of infrastructure within
a region, sD, or between regions, sI (see Martin (1999)). In line with the literature we im-
pose the restriction 1  sD  sD < sI ¼ sI , that is, transport costs are less costly within
a region than between regions, and infrastructure in the North is of better quality than in
the South. In each period t, every variety j of commodities (j ¼ 1; . . . ;N ) is produced by
an endogenous number of identical firms Qj;t > 1, each designated by qj (qj ¼ 1; . . . ;Qj;t),
competing “à la Cournot”.10 Both Qj;t and c are crucial variables of the model as they are
related to the extent of firms’ market power and the extent of firms’ agglomeration, re-
spectively. To keep the analysis simple and in line with empirical evidence, we suppose
that in each industry j, every firm qj engages simultaneously in the production of good j
and in R&D (see, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980)).
Denoting by Xqj;t the quantity of good produced by firm qj, the total amount of variety j
is Xj;t ¼
PQj;t
qj¼1 Xqj;t. The technology of production of every firm is given by
Xqj;t ¼ ðAqj;tÞ
LXqj;t ; (3)
where 0 <  < 1 denotes the returns to knowledge, LXqj;t is the quantity of labour devoted
to the production of a good, and Aqj;t is the stock of (specific) knowledge-capital produced
and used by firm qj. Each firm can improve its productivity over time by engaging in in-
house R&D via a process of cost reduction driven by the accumulation of firm-specific
knowledge-capital (cf. Peretto (1996)). The production function (3) does not include a
fixed or sunk cost, only variable costs. However, notice that in the (infinite horizon) open-
loop dynamic model we present, firms’ R&D expenditures are effectively sunk at every
point in time by all active firms. Hence, they are formally equivalent to fixed production
or maintenance costs (Spence (1984)).

















where d > 0, is the R&D productivity parameter. The term LAqj;t is the amount of labour
devoted to R&D, and l denotes the degree of inter-regional knowledge spillover.
Expression (4) represents the flow of knowledge generated by R&D. The R&D technology
(4) above exhibits constant returns to scale in the factor that is accumulated, i.e know-
ledge. Within each region firms are able to take full advantage of each other’s knowledge,
also helped by intra-regional perfect mobility of workers; however, outside each region
10 Notice that there are no segmented markets in this economy. Specifically, we assume a world market for each
commodity j ¼ 1; . . . ;N ; in which firms cannot price discriminate. Notice also, that we consider a symmetric
Cournot equilibrium, which entails industrial specialisation within regions.
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knowledge spillovers are not perfect and are region specific. Formally, this amounts to
imposing the restriction: 0  l < l  1.11
To close the model, we set the labour constraint in the North as















denote the aggregate quantity of
labour employed in the production of differentiated goods and employed in R&D, respect-
ively. In the sequel since the total number of workers is fixed, without loss of generality,
we set Lw ¼ 1.
3. Equilibrium
We proceed in three steps. First, we describe the behaviour of individuals and firms.
Second, we derive the equilibrium of the model assuming a given population distribution
across regions, g 2 ½1=2; 1, and no migration. Third, we analyse the choice of location of
individuals, and study the spatial equilibrium. As regards market structure, we assume
Cournot competition with free entry in the goods market (see below), and perfect competi-
tion in the labour market. We denote by wt the price of labour in the North and normalise
the price of labour in the South to one, that is wt ¼ 1.
3.1 Individuals and Firms
Each individual maximises lifetime utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2). The so-
lution of this programme is standard. The demand function for consumption good j of an
individual living in the North is given by cj;t ¼ Et=ðNsDpj;tÞ if 0 < j  cN and cj;t ¼













Firms perform two activities: (i) they produce and sell in an oligopolistic Cournot mar-
ket with free entry and exit and, (ii) they generate new pieces of knowledge-capital via
their in-house R&D using labour.
The market equilibrium we consider is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in open-loop strat-
egies.12 Denote by sqj ¼ ½Xqj;t ; LAqj;t ;Aqj;t  for t  0 firm qj’s strategy vector. To make the
11 It would be possible to also introduce imperfect intra-regional knowledge spillovers. In this case, the technology
(4) would read: Aqj ;t











; where k would stand
for the degree of intra-regional knowledge spillover, and verify: 0  l < l < k < k  1: However, im-
perfect intra-regional knowledge spillovers are not essential for our results and seriously complicate the model.
The more general analysis of the model for 0  l < l < k < k  1 is available from the authors upon
request.
12 The advantage of focusing on an open-loop equilibrium is that it allows a closed-form solution. The drawback
of using an open-loop equilibrium is that, typically, it does not have the property of subgame perfection.
Unfortunately, closed loop or feedback equilibria complicate the model substantially, as they do not guarantee a
closed form solution and, often, do not allow for a solution at all.
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analysis simple, we assume that entry and exit involve zero costs,13 meaning that the num-
ber of firms can freely adjust to its equilibrium level. In equilibrium firms commit to time
paths for production, R&D, and labour at time t, with entry and exit determining the num-
ber of active firms, Qj. Therefore, at time t the vector ½Qj; s1; . . . ; sj; . . . sQj  is an instantan-
eous equilibrium with free entry and exit if for all firms qj (and in all sectors, j ¼ 1; . . .N )
Pqj;t½Qj; s1; . . . ; sj; . . . sQj   Pqj;t½Qj; s1; . . . ; s0j; . . . sQj   0 ; (7)
and for Qj > 1
Pqj;t½Qj þ 1; s1; . . . ; sj; . . . sQjþ1  0 ; (8)
where ½Qj; s1; . . . ; s0j; . . . sQj  is the strategy vector when firm qj deviates from its optimal
time-paths while all other firms do not. Condition (7) requires that a firm maximises the
sum of present values of its net profits while taking as given the behaviour of the other
firms, and this value be non-negative. Condition (8) is a standard zero-profit condition.











subject to equations (3) and (6), and taking as given the law of motion of knowledge-




















































are taken as given by each firm. The term nt
is the co-state variable associated with (4) and
PQj;t
qj¼1
Xqj;t ¼ cdj;t. In this problem, the choice
variables are: Xqj;t (production of commodity j), L
A
qj;t
(quantity of labour employed in
R&D) and Aqj;t (the path of knowledge-capital). The first order conditions are given
by: @CVHqj;t=@Xqj;t ¼ 0; @CVHqj;t=@LAqj;t ¼ 0 and @CVHqj;t=@Aqj;t ¼  nt
•þrtnt. The trans-





13 Obviously this is a strong assumption. Effectively it is implying that R&D knowledge (as embodied in labour
hired and used in R&D activities) is substitutable across firms and varieties. It is made in order to keep the
model and its dynamics tractable. Notice though that R&D expenditure forms part of firm’s total costs and is
determined endogenously in market equilibrium, cf. (Peretto, 1996, p.897). Prospective entrants are aware that
these costs have to be incurred in the post-entry equilibrium.
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¼ 0, at which the marginal revenue of an extra unit of labour devoted to
R&D equals its cost (here wt) and there is no incentive for firms to deviate from the strat-


































Equation (11), where Xj;t 
PQj;t
qj¼1
Xqj;t, is the total production of variety j, implicitly gives
the best response of firm qj (i.e., Xqj;tÞ to the choice of production of good j of the other
firms. Note that this condition is used to determine the price level of each variety.
Since pj;t ¼ Xtðcdj;tÞ






Equation (14) shows that the price of each variety is determined by the product


















Þ) of an additional unit of labour
spent in R&D. Finally, equation (13) is a dynamic condition stating that the return (rt) of
a new piece of knowledge-capital depends on three factors: the productivity gains from
knowledge accumulation (cost reducing effect of R&D, (first term on the rhs)), the future
units of knowledge-capital (second term on the rhs) and the change in the shadow price of
knowledge-capital (third term on the rhs).15
Using (9), we derive the standard condition rtPqj;t ¼ P•qj;t þ pqj;t; where pqj;t ¼
pj;tXqj;t  wtLXqj;t  wtL
A
qj;t
is the instantaneous profit of a firm. Given that there is free
entry and exit, we have P ¼ P•  0. Using (3) and (14), we then obtain,
14 If @CVHqj ;t=@L
A
qj ;t
< 0, the marginal revenue of an extra unit of labour devoted to R&D is always negative







¼ gLw). Such an outcome can




produce new pieces of knowledge-capital, thereby improving their productivity and thus profitability vis-a-vis
their rivals. If @CVHqj ;t=@L
A
qj ;t
> 0, the marginal revenue of an extra unit of labour allocated to R&D is always







¼ gLw). The latter
can also be ruled out, as it leads to a meaningless solution with no production of (differentiated) goods (cf.
Peretto (1996)).
15 Note that, under perfect foresight, a firm can finance its own R&D through debt or equity, as the no arbitrage
condition (13) implies that the rate of return from a risk-less loan must be equal to the cost of financing R&D
by borrowing (cf. (Peretto, 1996, p. 904)).












 wtLXqj;t  wtL
A
qj;t
 0 : (15)
This is the zero profit condition for every firm qj ¼ 1; . . . ;Qj. Note that the standard
asset-pricing equation collapses into a a zero-profit condition because the number of firms
is a free to jump variable. 16
Finally, by combining (13), (3) and the zero profit condition above (15) we obtain the
rate of return to R&D in the industry (partial) equilibrium, that is










Noticeably, the cost reducing effect of R&D can be decomposed into the return to R&D
earned by the increase in the market share ð1 Xqj;t=Xj;tÞ, and the returns to R&D earned
for a given market share
wtLAqj ;t
Xqj ;t=Xj;t
. The latter implies that the incentive to innovate is the in-
cremental profit (gross-profit effect), while the former captures the potential gains from an
increase in rivals’ market shares (business-stealing effect). This is in keeping with many
IO models of R&D and is in line with Peretto (1996).17
3.2 Intra-regional equilibrium
Intra-regional equilibrium determines the number of firms in each sector, quantities and
prices for given shares of population (g and 1 g). We focus on an intra-regional sym-
metric equilibrium, whereby prices and quantities of goods are identical within a region
but, as it will be the case, different between regions. Formally,
Definition 1. For all sectors j in a given region, an intra-regional symmetric equilibrium
is characterised by the number of firms in each sector Qjt, quantities Xqjt and prices pjt
that are identical for all firms qj. For the North, we have
1. Qj;t ¼ Qt for all j  cN ,
2. Xqj;t ¼ Xj;t=Qt ¼ Xt=Qt; LXqj;t ¼ L
X
j;t=Qt ¼ LXt =ðcNQtÞ and LAqj;t ¼ L
A
j;t=Qt ¼
LAt =ðcNQtÞ for all qj and all j  cN , and
3. pj;t ¼ pt for all j  cN .
And similarly for the South.
Using the definition above, and combining the labour constraint (5) and the zero-profit
condition (15), we obtain aggregate employment in the production of goods and R&D
16 This is a feature specific to the setting developed here and can be related to Peretto and Connolly (2007), who
show that both horizontal and vertical dimension of technology are complementary. In their model, the quantity
of resources required to perform horizontal innovation is decreasing due to some external effect that makes
entry costs fall, and leads to closed-form solutions. In the limit case of zero entry cost, assumed here, it also
implies that the transitional dynamics compresses to a jump to the new steady state (see (Peretto and Connolly,
2007, p. 339)).
17 In Peretto (1996) the return to R&D is non-monotonic in the number of firms as a result of the tension between
the gross profit and the business stealing effects. Consequently, spillovers exert different influences on incen-
tives to undertake R&D depending on which effect dominates. In our model, in contrast, the gross-profit effect
always dominates the business stealing effect in (general) equilibrium (see Appendix 9.2). Recent empirical
work by Bloom et al. (2013) supports our result.
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That is, the share 1=Q of labour force is allocated to the production of R&D and, since
g  1=2 and l > l, the share of workers employed in each sector will be larger in the
North (See proposition 1 below). Interpreting the number of firms in each sector as a
proxy for the degree of markets’ competitiveness (Q ¼ Xj=Xqj ) it follows that: as firms’
market share in a given sector increases (Q #), firms allocate more labour to R&D and
less to the production of commodities.
To ensure existence, and other results to follow, from now on we impose the follow-
ing restriction on the returns to knowledge parameter, .
Assumption 1. Let  > qgd.
As shown in Appendix 9.1, Assumption 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition to
ensure a strictly positive long-term growth rate and is easily satisfied for plausible parameter
values.
In Appendix 9.1 we also formally demonstrate that a steady-state equilibrium exists,
that the adjustment to steady state is instantaneous, and that growth of knowledge-capital
is the same in the North and in the South. To simplify we assume that every firm starts
with the same endowment of knowledge-capital (Aqj;0 ¼ Aqj;0), though this is not essential
for the results.18 The following proposition summarises the main properties of the steady
state.
Proposition 1. (STEADY STATE) For any given population distribution g 2 ½1=2; 1
a. There exists a unique steady-state equilibrium solution to which the economy jumps
immediately,
b. The steady state is characterised by a constant (and common to all firms) level of
growth of capital-knowledge, g ¼ g; and a constant and equal number of firms in
each sector, Q ¼ Q, where Q > 1þ 1,
c. 1=2  g < c.
Proof. See Appendix 9.1 
Regions grow at the same rate in steady state, but crucially relative productivity levels
differ according to a region’s ability to make the most of innovation. Also, the number of
firms in each sector is the same for both regions in symmetric equilibrium (part b), and
the more productive region has a higher share of sectors with c > g (part c). The latter is
supported by ample empirical evidence (Carlino and Kerr (2014)) documenting that R&D
activities are more concentrated than employment (the measure of agglomeration
economies).
The equilibrium system expressed in terms of c and Q (derived in Appendix 9.1)
reads as
18 If Aqj ;0 6¼ Aqj ;0; the knowledge gap between firms of different regions would remain constant over time as the
economy jumps immediately to the steady state (see Appendix 9.1).
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ð1 gÞ 1þ l cð1 cÞ
 





ð1þ Þ½cþ lð1 cÞ dgc
½cþ lð1 cÞ dgc  q
> 1 : (20)
From equation (19) we can express c as a function of exogenous parameters, which
then, through (20), gives Q as function of exogenous parameters.
Starting from the equilibrium share of sectors, c, few comments are in order. First, there
is a differentiated spillover effect according to which the share of industries located in each
region is positively related to the region specific spillover (for details see Appendix 9.3).
This effect is reinforced by a factor endowment effect (captured by the terms in g in (19))
according to which the share of sectors located in a given region is positively related to its
population share: dc=dg > 0 (readily follows from (19)). Intuitively, a larger population share
creates a larger market for commodities and allows firms to conduct R&D at a greater scale.
This is also an agglomerating force, and reminiscent of a home market effect whereby the
larger region hosts a more than proportionate share of industries (see Krugman (1980)).
Turning to the equilibrium number of firms, Q, we can establish that dQ=dl <
0; dQ=dl < 0 and dQ=dg < 0.19 Intuitively, when l and/or l take greater values, the
productivity of labour in R&D improves. As a result, the demand of labour in R&D
increases thereby rising R&D costs. This is equivalent to a rise in the entry level of R&D,
leading to a reduction in the number of operating firms. Lastly, a higher concentration of peo-
ple in the North, ceteris paribus, reduces competitiveness (dQ=dg < 0). In fact, a larger pool
of workers allows firms to conduct R&D at a larger scale, which pushes up LA (relative to
LX) and increases the mark up over marginal costs. These steady state properties are reminis-
cent of Smulders and Van de Klundert (1995) and imply, as we shall see shortly, that market
concentration triggered by inter-regional knowledge spillovers is conducive of growth.
The equilibrium wage and general price level are analysed next.
Total production of commodity j must be equal to the number of firms, Q, times
quantity produced by each firm, (3); then, using the definition of Xt (see (10)) and com-
bining it with (5), (15) and (17), we obtain the wage equation for the North,








Using the same method, we derive the wage for the South,








Taking into account that the level of expenditure per capita is determined by the wage
(E¼w and E ¼ w) and w ¼ 1 (by normalisation), the level of wage in the North, w,
must adjust so that both conditions are simultaneously satisfied. After straightforward
computations, we obtain the following expression
19 See Appendix 9.3 for analytical derivations.

























implicitly defining w as function of all exogenous variables. Therefore, we establish the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. (WAGE IN THE NORTH). For any given g 2 ½1=2; 1, an equilibrium level w
exists and is unique; moreover w > w ¼ 1.
Proof. See Appendix 9.4. 
In line with empirical evidence (Head and Mayer (2010); Redding (2011)) we find that the
wage differential across regions is positively correlated with the population share in the larger
region ðdw=dg > 0Þ.20 Intuitively, a larger share of workers implies a larger labour supply of
labour that, in turn, prompts the location of a greater share of sectors (dc=dg > 0) and drives
up the wage (dw=dc > 0). Note, also, that from (14) and w ¼ 1 it immediately follows that
p=p ¼ w. Finally, transport costs are not crucial to explain the wage/price differential across
regions. Indeed, w > w for any 1=2  g < c and no transport costs. 21
Turning to the general price index, hereafter denoted by P, we obtain 22
P ¼ ðsDpÞcðsI pÞ1c < P ¼ ðsI pÞcðsDpÞ
1c; for g  1=2 : (22)
In the region that hosts a larger share of industries, a greater proportion of goods are
purchased without incurring the high inter-regional transport cost, sI. Therefore, individu-
als residing in the North benefit not only from a higher wage, but also from a lower price
index than individuals located in the South; a set of circumstances that should make the
Northern region more attractive. As we shall see shortly, this will play a role in the ana-
lysis of the migration decision of individuals.
Finally, we close this subsection by writing the common level of growth of know-





¼ dLAqj;t½cNQþ lð1 cÞNQ : (23)
Accordingly, growth depends on labour employed in R&D and on the relative produc-
tion of knowledge (term in squared brackets). In symmetric equilibrium LAqj ¼ L
A=ðcNQÞ,
and using (18) into the above we obtain,






Growth is determined by two endogenous variables: the number of firms per industry,
Q, and the share of industries located in a given region, c. Both Q and c are variables
affected by g, l and l, among other parameters. Later on in the paper, we carry out the
equilibrium growth analysis and related comparative statics (see Section 5).
20 Specifically, we obtain dw=dg > 0; with limg!0 w ¼ lsD=sI < 1 and limg!1 w ¼ sI=ðlsDÞ > 1. See
Appendix 9.4.
21 The role of transport costs is analysed in depth in Section 6.
22 The choice of a Fisher price index is made for convenience. Since it is computed as a geometric mean, it will be
easier for us to interpret some of the results we derive later, particularly, regarding the migration condition.
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3.3 Spatial equilibrium
Having set out the behaviour of agents, conditional on given shares of individuals in each
region (g and 1 g), we now explore the conditions required for a spatial equilibrium.
We begin by defining a spatial equilibrium.
Definition 2. A population share ĝ 2 ð0; 1 is a spatial equilibrium, if individuals have no
incentives to move away from the region in which they are originally located.
As long as the differential in utility between North and South (i.e. DU ¼ U  U) is
lower, in absolute value, than the cost of migration, then, individuals born and residing in




















where m denotes the migration cost of an individual.
Using the property that the economy jumps immediately to the steady state, together
with the individual demand functions, and expressions (14) and (22), we can simplify the
above to obtain,





j  m : (25)
Notice that, as w> 1 and P < P, it follows that DU > 0 implying that migration
never occurs from North to South. Indeed, in terms of utility, workers residing in the
North fare better than those residing in the South, since they benefit from a higher wage
and a lower price index. For later purposes, using (25) above and (22), the difference in
the present value of utility reads as






















> 0 : (27)
Since 1  sD  sD < sI ; dc=dg > 0 and dw=dg > 0, equation (27) implies that the
utility differential is positively correlated with the population share in the North. In other
words, a larger population in the North creates more incentives for individuals to migrate
from the South to the North.
Keeping the above in mind, we can now turn to the characterisation of the spatial
equilibrium, then to the analysis of migration and location of individuals and firms. In the
spirit of Murata (2003), location preferences are idiosyncratic, implying a smooth migra-
tion function. Specifically, disregarding individuals in the North who always stay put, we
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assume that the migration costs of individuals in the South, m, are drawn from a uniform
distribution with support [mlow, mhigh]. Depending on the size of m different scenarios
emerge for individuals in the South. To analyse the possible outcomes, let us define the
cut-off value m such that DU  m ¼ 0, that is the level of the migration cost at which
individuals are indifferent between staying put or migrating
Solving DU ¼ m for the population share g, potentially, gives two possible solutions
for the population distribution: one for the case of migration from North to South and the
other for migration from South to North. As mentioned above, migration from the North
to the South cannot occur, hence this solution can be ruled out. We thus denote by g the
unique possible solution for the population distribution for which DU  m ¼ 0. Notably,
there is a one for one correspondence between m and g. This is because migration costs
are drawn from the set of individuals in the South. Therefore, determining m automatically
sets g. Moreover, since DUðgÞ > 0 and dDU=dg > 0, it follows that g > 0.
If migration costs for individuals in the South verifies mhigh < m, and (25) always holds
with a strict inequality (i.e., DU < m when DU  m ¼ 0), then any initial population distri-
bution is a dispersed spatial equilibrium. If, however, migration costs verify 0 < m < mhigh,
then any initial population distribution is an agglomerated spatial equilibrium. In these two ex-
treme cases, migration costs are either low enough so that all individuals migrate to the North,
or too large implying that individuals in the South stay put. Lastly, there is the intermediate
case in which individuals in the South face migration costs verifying 0 < mlow < m <
mhigh. In this scenario, solving DU ¼ m determines the population distribution g that sustains
a dispersed spatial equilibrium, with 0 < g < 1. The following proposition summarises.
Proposition 3. (SPATIAL EQUILIBRIA). Define g as the population distribution satisfying
DU  m ¼ 0. Then there exists a critical cut-off value for the migration cost,m, such that
a. For 0 < mlow  m  mhigh: Any initial population distribution g0 2 ½0; 1 is a dis-
persed spatial equilibrium, ĝ ¼ g;
b. For 0 < m  mlow < mhigh: Any initial population distribution g0 2 ½0; 1 is a dis-
persed spatial equilibrium, ĝ ¼ g0;
c. For 0 < mlow < mhigh  m: Any initial population distribution g0 2 ½0; 1 is an
agglomerated spatial equilibrium, ĝ ¼ 1.
Proposition 3 establishes that, with migration, different types of spatial equilibria may
arise. One is an agglomerated equilibrium: in part (c) individuals and firms locate in the
North. In the remaining cases, we obtain a dispersed equilibrium where individuals and
firms are located in both regions. Notably, while in part (b) some individuals initially born
in the South have a migration cost which is too high to induce migration to the North, in
the intermediate case (part a) any change in DU will affect the corresponding value of the
migration cost m (solution of DU ¼ m) and, thereby, the corresponding population distri-
bution, g. In the latter scenario, individuals can potentially migrate to the North, provided
that the utility differential between North and South diminishes, as will be discussed fur-
ther in the following sections.
Finally, we link Proposition 3 with Proposition 1 that established conditions of exist-
ence and uniqueness for a potential dispersed equilibrium, requiring g 2 ð1=2; 1Þ. Recall
that in the context of Proposition 1, individuals were assumed to stay put and migration
costs had not been introduced. To proceed, we need to compare g and 1/2. In principle,
we can have 0 < g < 1=2 or 1=2  g < 1: Indeed, if g is close to 1/2 we can have
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DUðgÞ > 0; with g < 1=2: However, this case can be ruled out as g < 1=2 would
contradict the condition of existence and uniqueness (Proposition 1). Hence, under
Proposition 1, the solution to (25) necessarily implies 1=2  g. Accordingly, we establish
the following.
Corollary 1. For 0 < mlow  m < mhigh and g0 2 ð1=2; 1Þ, there exists a unique spatial
equilibrium ĝ ¼ g where individuals and firms are dispersed.
Corollary 1 is instrumental for the analysis carried out in the next section. Before pro-
ceeding further, it is instructive to study the parameter conditions under which the corol-
lary applies. As shown in Appendix 9.4, limg!1 w ¼ 1l
sI
sD
; thus, in the limit g¼ 1 the





the term in square brackets is greater than one, the equation DU ¼ m has a solution for m








Corollary 1 applies. Closer examination of this condition shows that a lower interregional
transportation cost, sI, or a greater rate of time preference, q; or a larger knowledge spill-
overs in the South, l, or a higher intra-regional transportation cost in the North, sD, re-
inforce the conditions for a dispersed equilibrium. Intuitively, the parameters sI, sD and l
act through the relative wage and the relative price index (see 25) making the North less
desirable. As for q, the potential future utility gains of migrating to the North are reduced
as the rate of time preference increases.
4. Dispersion and Agglomeration
The previous sub-section has highlighted the role played by the non—pecuniary migration
cost in establishing the kind of steady state we obtain. Here, we assess whether the inter-
regional knowledge spillovers either reinforce the dispersed equilibrium or trigger a switch
to an agglomerated equilibrium where individuals and firms agglomerate in a single (core)
region. We carry out the analysis assuming that, initially, the economy is at a unique dis-
persed equilibrium (Corollary 1) and look at a decrease in l for a given l. As seen ear-
lier, a greater gap in knowledge spillovers leads to a greater productivity in the R&D
sectors of firms located in the North, thereby the share of industries operating in the North
increases. This has also a positive impact on the wage, making the Northern region more
attractive. Indeed, by differentiating (26) with respect to l it can be easily checked that

















< 0 ; (28)
making it more desirable for individuals to migrate. Thus, higher regional dispersion in
knowledge spillovers may lead to agglomeration. However, it may be also compatible with
a dispersed equilibrium, if differences in spillovers between regions are initially not too
large, which is the most empirically plausible scenario.23 In this case, the productivity
23 The most recent empirical work, using U.S. firm level accounting data matched into U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office data, documents that cross-regional spillovers are reduced in strength and correlated to geographical dis-
tance (Lychagin et al. (2016)).
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advantage held by the most advanced region is not high enough to compensate for its
higher wage triggered by higher demand of labour in the R&D sector. Notably, firms’ dis-
persion is also robust to the possibility of migration. The following proposition
summarises.
Proposition 4. (SPILLOVERS, DISPERSION AND AGGLOMERATION). Given the migration cost 0 <
mlow < m < mhigh and the corresponding initial population distribution g that supports
the dispersed spatial equilibrium, there exists a cut-off value l such that
a. ĝ ¼ g is a dispersed spatial equilibrium for all l < l < l, and
b. ĝ ¼ 1 is an agglomerated spatial equilibrium for all l < l < l.
Proof. See Appendix 9.5. 
This Proposition is important as it highlights the role played by the degree of spill-
over in the South on individuals’ decision to migrate and on firms’ choice to relocate. To
gain intuition, consider the two polar cases of l decreasing and increasing, respectively.
First, as l decreases, individuals in the South will migrate to the North by increasing
order migration costs. This will also induce firms to relocate to the North. In this case, we
have both migration of individuals and relocation of firms. If, on the other hand, we con-
sider an increase in l; the North becomes less attractive. So individuals in the South stay
put, meaning that the population distribution g that supports the initial equilibrium remains
unchanged: there is no migration of individuals. However, we obtain a relocation of some
sector to the South.
5. Growth and inter-regional inequality
To study the implications for growth and inter-regional income inequality, we focus on the
case where the economy is at an equilibrium in which not all R&D activities and not all
workers are concentrated in the most productive region (Corollary 1). Evidence suggests
that this is indeed the most plausible real world scenario.
Using LAqj ¼ L
A
j =Q ¼ LA=ðcNQtÞ, (18) and plugging in equation (23) the value of Q





½cþ lð1 cÞ  q
 
: (29)
Recall that in equilibrium the share of sectors c depends on g, l and l (see (19)).
Therefore, the equilibrium growth rate depends on the share of population located in the
North and on knowledge spillovers. Tedious computations, relegated in appendix, lead to
the following.
Proposition 5. (GROWTH). Along the equilibrium path defined by Corollary 1, and for any
l < l < l






Proof. See Appendix 9.3.4. 






/joeg/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeg/lbab019/6375387 by guest on 06 O
ctober 2021
Intuitively, productivity of R&D increases as knowledge spillovers increase (part a).
Notably, this effect is stronger in the lagging region (part b). Recall that, as the R&D
sector becomes more productive two things happen: (i) firms allocate a greater amount of
labour to R&D and, (ii) more industries choose to operate in the region experiencing prod-
uctivity gains. Since labour cost is higher in the North (w > w), more industries set up in
the South when l increases than in the North for an equivalent increase in l. As a result,
l has a stronger effect on growth than l.
Turning to inter-regional income inequality, in the context of the present model, this
is given by the wage gap between North and South. Recall that w ¼ 1 and w comes from
expression (21). The latter, is indirectly affected by l and l through c.
Proposition 6. (SPILLOVERS AND INTER-REGIONAL INEQUALITY). Along the equilibrium path defined
by Corollary 1, and for any l < l < l, inter-regional inequality increases (decreases)
with l (l).
Proof. See Appendix 9.6. 
These findings suggest that strengthening the ability of the lagging region to capture
knowledge leads to higher overall growth and a reduction of regional disparities. This is
consistent, for example with empirical research documenting local spatial externalities be-
tween university research and high technology innovative activity, and the idea that pro-
moting institutions that facilitate knowledge flows are important in supporting regional
development (Jaffe (1989); Acs et al. (1992); Anselin et al. (1997); Kantor and Whalley
(2014)).
From a welfare stand point, along the dispersed equilibrium path (and for any
l < l < l), we have seen that improving knowledge diffusion in the South reduces
the welfare gap between North and South (see expression (28) establishing that dDUdl < 0).
The latter, however, may come at the cost of creating regional winners and losers.
Interestingly, we find that individuals in both regions are likely to gain. Computations
(relegated in Appendix 9.7), show that the welfare effects of l in the North and in the


























































In the expressions above we can identify several welfare effects. The first term in
squared brackets captures the degree of competition (static) effect, which is common to
both regions and negative in sign. As seen earlier (Section 3.2), when l increases, the
number of firms in each sector decreases ( dQdl < 0), reducing competitiveness and increas-
ing the price of each good produced. The second term in squared brackets captures the
change in the relative wage, and is negative for the North and positive for the South
( dwdl < 0); while the third and fourth terms capture the impact of the change in the share
of industries operating in the North ( dcdl < 0). The latter, noticeably, affects the relative
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price index between regions in opposite directions, positively for the South and negatively
for the North. Finally the fifth term, common to both regions, captures the long-term
growth effect induced by greater knowledge spillovers in R&D. By differentiating (24) we








dl > 0, suggesting that the dynamic welfare gains are two-
fold: (i) associated to the trade off between firms’ market power and growth ( dQdl > 0),
and (ii) related to the effect of knowledge spillovers on the share of industries operating in
the North ( dcdl > 0). Notice, in particular, that the effect of knowledge spillovers on
firms’ mark up arises because the number of operating firms decreases as R&D becomes
more productive; we term this the dynamic competition effect.
Tedious computations (relegated in Appendix 9.7) show that the dynamic competi-






dl. In other words,
the growth gains associated with fewer and more productive firms outweigh the static
losses associated with a lower degree of competitiveness (higher prices). As a result, indi-
viduals in the South unambiguously gain from higher knowledge spillover in their region
(dU

dl > 0). If, in addition,
dU
dl > 0, then individuals in the North also gain from narrowing
the gap in knowledge spillovers between the advanced and the lagging region. By direct
inspection of (30) and (31), and disregarding the term with transport costs, it is apparent
that the change in the relative wage separates the two expressions. Hence for dUdl > 0 to















ing proposition restates the result.
Proposition 7. (WELFARE). Assume transport costs are negligible (sD ¼ sD ¼ sI ! 1). Then
along the equilibrium path defined by Corollary 1, and for any l < l < l, narrowing
the gap in knowledge spillovers result in welfare gains for both regions, if   ̂ where
̂ is implicitly given by the solution of
cqð1 cÞð1þ ̂Þ½cþ lð1 cÞ
̂ð1 gÞlf̂ ½cþ lð1 cÞdg cqg ¼ 1
and c is at its equilibrium level, given by equation (A.5) in the appendix.
Proof. See Appendix 9.7 
Since c is independent of the parameters ; d and q the conditions ensuring   ̂ are not
particularly restrictive; for instance, d large enough relative to q would suffice. Proposition
7 implies that, transport costs aside, the welfare gains associated with the increase in the
share of industries operating in the South are likely to outweigh the welfare losses associ-
ated with the lower relative wage in the North, implying a net welfare gain for the North
too. Allowing for inter-regional transport costs weakens the potential welfare gains in the
North, since it generates a larger wage gap across regions. This is explained in more detail
in the following section.
6. Transport costs
In this section we briefly mention what role transport costs play in our model. In the
economic geography literature it is usually argued that transport costs are crucial in shaping
the distribution of activities (Krugman (1991); Fujita et al. (1999)) and in explaining the
dynamics between growth and agglomeration (see, e.g, Minerva and Ottaviano (2009)). In
these models, which typically assume monopolistic competition and increasing returns to
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scale, the innovation sector requires goods which incur transport costs, so that industrial
concentration, by reducing the input cost of innovation, increases the growth rate.
From direct inspection of (29) one can immediately check that, in our setup, the equilib-
rium growth rate does not depend on transport costs. This is because inter- and intra-re-
gional transport costs (sI ; sD; sD) do not directly influence the input costs of innovation
and, therefore, play no role in the equilibrium location of industries (nor on their degree
of competitiveness).
Transport costs, though, do influence the income differential between regions. Consider,
for instance, the effect of a higher inter-regional transport cost. Simple algebra shows that
w (see (21)) is increasing in sI if the number of industries located in the North is greater
than in the South (i.e. dw=dsI > 0 as 1=2  g < c). The reason is that an increase in sI
induces a decrease in individual demands for foreign varieties and, as the Northern region
is more populated in terms of firms (c > 1=2Þ, such an effect is more pronounced in the
South than in the North. As a result, the relative price of varieties increases, which, ultim-
ately, generates a larger wage gap across regions.24 This also suggests that, ceteris paribus,
the lower the transport cost the more likely are dispersed equilibria. Intuitively, when the
transport cost sI decreases, on the one hand foreign varieties are cheaper and, on the other
hand, the wage in the North decreases (dw=dsI > 0). Both effects make the Northern re-
gion less attractive for individuals in the South.25
Finally, due to the price index effect highlighted above, transport costs affect the change
in regional welfare associated with higher l. Namely, transport costs strengthen the posi-
tive welfare effect in the South but weaken the potential welfare gain in the North.
7. Extensions
In what follows, we discuss how our model may be extended to allow for population
growth and firm heterogeneity. We draw from Peretto (1998) to explore the role of popula-
tion growth, and from Impullitti and Licandro (2018) to introduce firm heterogeneity in our
set-up. These extensions require some modifications and additional assumptions which are
explained next. The more technical and lengthy computations are relegated in Appendix 9.9.










¼ x, with 0 < x < q. For simplicity, the population growth rate
is set identical across regions. The allocation of the world population remains: Lt ¼ gLwt
and Lt ¼ ð1 gÞLwt at any time. To account for population growth, the utility function





log ðcj;tÞ=NteðqxÞtdt, where L0 is the total number of indi-
viduals residing in the North at time zero, and q x can be interpreted as the net rate of
time preference. Finally, to ensure constant growth rates of variables in steady state, the
number of varieties grows exogenously at the same rate as population: Nt ¼ N0ext, with
N0 representing the number of sectors at date zero. Hence, Nt
• ¼ xNt.
Incumbent firms’ production technology (3) is unchanged, while the R&D technology is
slightly modified. Following Impullitti and Licandro (2018), we assume:
24 The same logic applies to a change in sD and sD:
25 Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and Tabuchi et al. (2018), also obtain that a lower inter-regional transport cost does
not necessarily lead to agglomeration, while Martin and Ottaviano (1999) point out that transport costs are in-
consequential for growth if spillovers are global rather than local.















qj¼1 Aqj;t=Q is the average productivity of those producing in the same
sector j.26 The term Dt ¼ ~At=Aj;t denotes the difficulty of innovation, and is related to the
distance between the average productivity of the overall economy and the average prod-
uctivity of firms belonging to the same sector. Average productivity of the overall econ-










This specification implies that innovation is harder for firms belonging to sectors which
use a greater amount of knowledge in their production process. 28
Two comments are in order. First, compared to technology (4), the production of new
pieces of knowledge which spill over is an average stock across sectors, rather than an en-
tire stock. As it will become clear later, this feature is instrumental to avoid explosive
growth in steady state. Furthermore, income per capita growth is now positively related to
the average firm size, thereby eliminating scale effects (see, Laincz and Peretto (2006) and
Bond-Smith (2019)).
Second, firms are heterogeneous. In line with Impullitti and Licandro (2018), heterogen-
eity between firms stems from the amount of knowledge required to produce a given var-
iety of good j. Specifically, firms belonging to a given sector are identical, while firm
productivity differs across sectors. Notation-wise, we have: Aqj;t ¼ Aj;t=Q ¼ Aj;t for any
qj ¼ 1; . . . ;Q, and Aj;t 6¼ Ak;t for any j; k ¼ 1; . . . ;Nt.
With regard to potential entrants, building on Impullitti and Licandro (2018), we assume
that, at any time, a new variety among the non-operative varieties can be introduced at
zero cost by Q firms associated to it. At the time of entry, each firm producing a new var-
iety draws a common stock of knowledge, Aqj;t ¼ Aj;t=Q ¼ Aj;t, from a time-invariant dis-
tribution. Following Klette and Kortum (2004), we assume a discrete uniform distribution
with support (Amint ;A
max




t ) for the South, respect-
ively.29 We posit that the northern region is more productive implying that, at any










Finally, to ensure a steady state in which every firm (incumbents and entrants) grows at
the same common growth rate, the distributions of knowledge must de facto depend on the
endogenous growth rate, g. Formally, this means that, at any time t, in any sector j, north-




26 As firms are identical within a sector, we have Aj;t ¼ Aqj ;t for any qj ¼ 1; . . . ;Q.
27 For the South, the amount of knowledge spillover is defined as: ~A








28 Impullitti and Licandro (2018) also assume decreasing returns to innovation (see p.195, and empirical evidence
cited therein).
29 Akcigit and Kerr (2018) also extend the analysis by Klette and Kortum (2004), by developing a model in which
heterogeneous firms perform both internal and external R&D. Their setup provides a characterisation of innov-
ation behaviour across different-sized firms and its implications for growth. Here we stick to a simpler formula-
tion to focus on the implications for the geography of knowledge of firm-specific R&D.
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As noted by Impullitti and Licandro (2018), this assumption is akin to a spillover from
incumbents to entrants. Furthermore, since distributions are time-invariant, it follows that





gt at any time, where A0 > A

0 > 0 are the average productivity
levels at date zero in the North and South, respectively. It, therefore, follows that firm
heterogeneity translates into differences in average knowledge between regions.
Repeating the same analysis of Section 3, we solve for the intra-regional equilibrium
under heterogeneity and population growth. As shown in Appendix 9.9, we recover a set
of equations reminiscent of the model with homogeneous firms, but for the terms x and
At=A

t  H. In the spirit of conciseness, in what follows we focus on the impact of het-
erogeneity on our main results; then, on the role of demographic shocks on the model
outcomes.30
Firm heterogeneity strengthens the productivity advantage of the North and, consequent-
ly, it weakens the relocation of firms from North to South when the degree of spillovers
in the South increase, i.e., d
2c
dldH < 0. Similarly, we find that the the impact on inter-
regional utility differential is weakened, i.e., d
2DU
dldH < 0. This is because heterogeneity
mitigates the change in the relative wage between North and South and, thereby, the utility
gain associated with higher knowledge spillover in the South. In conclusion, firm hetero-
geneity translates into differences in average knowledge between regions, mitigating
the scale of firm relocation and inter-regional income and utility changes associated with a
reduction in the gap in knowledge spillovers between regions.31
Finally, let us analyse the role of the rate of population growth. By direct inspection of
(A.11) it can be checked that changes in the population growth rate have no effect on c,
since x is common to both regions. For the same reason, the equilibrium wage is inde-
pendent of x; therefore, changes in the rate of growth of population have no impact on
the spatial equilibrium. On the other hand, higher population growth allows for a greater
share of the workforce to be engaged in R&D. As a consequence, the number of firms in
each sector decreases and the growth rate increases.32
8. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have constructed a two-region growth model in which firms operate
under Cournot competition and innovate through in-house R&D. Drawing from the evi-
dence that both intra and inter-regional spillovers matter, our main aim was to study how
regional disparities in innovation enhancing activities, coupled with migration costs, shape
the geography of economic activities and the market structure.
We have shown that disparities in knowledge spillovers between regions lead to spatial
concentration of industries, and the latter is associated with fewer, but more innovative
30 See Appendix 9.9 for details on analytical computations.
31 Note that the effect of H on dg=dl (and dQ=dl) is neutral. This is because the assumption of increasing in-
novation difficulty, which equalises growth rates, offsets the positive effect of greater productivity on innov-
ation efforts.
32 Recall that population growth enters in the utility function, and the net rate of time preference is now given by q
x < q: Thus, as population growth increases, individuals put a higher weight on future consumption relative to
present consumption. This means that a lower amount of labour is allocated to production of commodities and a
greater amount is allocated to R&D, leading to higher growth. Note that, in contrast to our model, in Peretto
(1998) firms operate under monopolistic competition (implying that there is one firm per sector as if Q¼ 1), and
since the number of firms grows at the same rate as population, productivity growth is independent of the popula-
tion growth rate. In our model, with Cournot competition within each sector, productivity growth is affected by
population growth because firms’ market share in a given sector (1=Q) is itself affected by population growth.
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firms. Frictions in the movement of workers, on the other hand, limit the geographic con-
centration of economic activities in the most productive region. In this context, a weaken-
ing of the spatial disparities in knowledge spillovers between the advanced and the
lagging region reduces income inequality, while preserving the positive effect on growth.
This occurs because reductions in productivity advantages make firms more sensitive to
wage differentials, leading to a rise in the share of industries operating in the lagging re-
gion. Welfare increases because the growth gains associated with fewer and more innova-
tive firms outweigh the static losses associated with higher mark ups, and because the
gains associated with the change in the spatial concentration of industries are likely to out-
weigh the losses associated with lower relative wages in the advanced region.
We have also considered whether transport costs play any role in shaping the distribution
of activities across regions and found that the latter do not influence the equilibrium location
of industries. This is consistent with the growing body of literature emphasising frictions in
knowledge flows as source of agglomeration economies. Finally, extending the model to
consider heterogeneous firms and population growth shows the robustness of our results.
9. Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Equation (19) draws from g ¼ g (Proposition 1 b) together with (4), (5) and (16), while equa-
tion (20) draws from Q ¼ Q (Proposition 1 b) together with (4), (12), (17) and (18) and the
fact that, at the steady state, rt ¼ q. The proof is structured as follows. First we show that, in a
symmetric equilibrium, the economy jumps immediately to a steady state where g ¼ g.
Second, that in the symmetric equilibrium, Q ¼ Q. Finally we prove existence and uniqueness.
9.1.1 Step 1, showing that g ¼ g








and an equivalent condition is satisfied for the South. Since Et ¼ wt ¼ 1 at
each instant, and the consumer problem implies that Et
• =Et ¼ Et • =Et ¼ rt  q at each in-
stant, it follows that Et ¼ E and rt ¼ q. Thus, the wage equations in the North and in the
South imply that the wage in the North, and the share of sectors locating in the North (South)
jump immediately to their steady state values.
From the individual demand functions (ct ¼ Et=ðNsDptÞ and ct ¼ Et=ðNsI pt Þ for
0 < j  cN ), it follows that ptct and pt ct must be constant. Therefore, at the aggregate





t ) must be constant. Therefore, the number of firms Q (Q
) in each sector
j ¼ 1; . . . ;N ; jumps immediately to its steady-state value.









Differentiating with respect to time yields



























¼ qþ dgQ 1
cNQ2












cNQ2 cNQþ lð1 cÞNQ 1Ât
h i


















where we have dropped the subscript t to indicate the steady-state value of Â. Direct inspec-
tion of this dynamic equation shows that, if 1 ðQ 1Þ < 0 (i.e., Q > 1= þ 1) the econ-
omy jumps immediately to its steady state where g ¼ g.
9.1.2 Step 2, showing that Q ¼ Q




½cNQþ lð1 cÞNQ  ð1 gÞð1 cÞ ½ð1 cÞNQ
 þ lcNQ : (A.2)
Using (3), (4), (12), (13), (17) and (18), we obtain
q ¼ d½cNQþ lð1 cÞNQ gðQ 1Þ
cNQ2
 d½cNQþ lð1 cÞNQ g
cNQ2
: (A.3)
Noting that we can derive an equivalent expression for the South, the two equations above
imply that Q ¼ Q.
9.1.3 Step 3, Existence and uniqueness
From equation (A.2), using Q ¼ Q, we obtain
g 1þ l ð1 cÞ
c
 
¼ ð1 gÞ 1þ l cð1 cÞ
 
: (A.4)
It can be easily checked that the left hand side (hereafter LHS) is strictly decreasing, with
limc!0 LHS ¼ þ1 and limc!1 LHS ¼ g: Similarly, the right hand side (hereafter, RHS) is
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strictly increasing, with limc!0 RHS ¼ ð1 gÞ and limc!1 RHS ¼ þ1. Since
0  l < l  1, it follows that there exists a unique solution for c verifying 0  c  1.
Rearranging (A.4) yields the following quadratic equation
½ð1 gÞl  ð1 2gÞ  lgc2 þ ½1 2gþ 2lgc lg ¼ 0 :
Simple computations show that the solution is given by
c ¼
ð1 2gþ 2lgÞ þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ð1 2gÞ2 þ 4lgð1 gÞl
q
2½ð1 gÞl  ð1 2gÞ  lg ; (A.5)
where it can easily be verified that 0 < 1=2  g < c  1 for any population distribution
verifying g 2 ½1=2; 1:
To compute Q, using Q ¼ Q in (A.3) and re-arranging terms, we obtain (20).
Finally, plugging (20) in (24), we obtain:
g ¼ dg½cþ lð1 cÞ  cq
cð1þ Þ :
The above expression clearly shows that  > qdg is a necessary and sufficient condition for
g> 0 (cf. Assumption 1), since the RHS is strictly increasing in c.
9.2 Gross-profit and business-stealing effects







stealing effect (ð1 Xqj;t=Xj;tÞ) and the gross profit effect (
wtLAqj ;t
Xqj ;t=Xj;t





cQN. Recall that the gross profit effect is increasing in firms’ market power
(decreasing in the number of firms) while the reverse applies to the business stealing effect. In
equilibrium the product of the two effects, hereafter denoted by C, is given by (for any N> 2)











g > 1, which is inde-









implying that the gross profit effect dominates the business stealing effect.
9.3 Comparative statics
9.3.1 Change in c with respect to l; l and g
Applying the implicit function theorem to (A.4), we obtain




































1þ l ð1 cÞ
c











9.3.2 Change in Q with respect to l; l and g







(20) it readily follows that @Q@c ¼
gdðþ1Þql














¼ dgqð1 cÞcð1þ Þ



























Therefore, the sign of dQ=dg is the same as the sign of 1 gLA dL
A















Simplifying the above expression, 1 gLA dL
A








 þ glð1 cÞð1 gÞc :
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 1 in the equa-




ð1 gÞ < 1;
which is always satisfied since 0 < l < 1 and c > g. Therefore, dQ=dg < 0:
9.3.3 Change in LA with respect to g

















dð þ 1Þ d
cqlð1 cÞ2
c2ð1 gÞl þ glð1 cÞ2
 !
1
½cþ lð1 cÞð1 gÞ
" #
:
From (20), we know that d > cqg½cþlð1cÞ : Therefore, let us show
cqlð1 cÞ2
c2ð1 gÞl þ glð1 cÞ2
 !
1
½cþ lð1 cÞð1 gÞ <
cq
g½cþ lð1 cÞ ;














 1 into the




ð1 gÞ < 1;
which is always satisfied as c > g and 0 < l < 1:Therefore, dLA=dg > 0:
9.3.4 Change in g with respect to l and l
Recall that the equilibrium growth rate is given by
g ¼
d½cþ lð1 cÞ gc  q
ð1þ Þ :
Differentiating with respect to l and l yields, respectively









































9.4.1 Proof that w > w ¼ 1
Equation (21) readily shows that its LHS is strictly increasing with limw!0 LHS ¼ gsI=sD <
limw!0 RHS ¼ þ1 and limw!þ1 LHS ¼ þ1 > limw!þ1 RHS ¼ cgsI=½ð1 cÞð1
gÞsD : Therefore, the solution for the level of wage is unique. Moreover, under the assump-
tion sI=sD > sI=sD and the property c > g  1=2; we can check
lim
w!1

















i.e., the intersection between LHS and RHS in (21) necessarily occurs at w > 1:
9.4.2 Proof that dw=dg > 0














1 c ¼ 0 : (A.6)
















Applying the implicit function theorem to (A.6), and substituting w by its value given by






















































@g would be negative.
Starting from the latter, where we substitute w by its value given by (A.7), after some
manipulations, we obtain the following inequality















1 c < 0;
which is always satisfied as sI > sD > sD:






























½ð1 gÞl þ g > c:
To show that the above condition is always verified, let us recall that (A.4) is given by
ð1 gÞ 1þ l cð1 cÞ
 




Now let us define
LHSðcÞ ¼ ð1 gÞ 1þ l cð1 cÞ
 
;




We know that LHSðcÞ is strictly increasing and RHSðcÞ is strictly decreasing. Moreover,
we can easily check that
RHS
g




lð1 gÞ þ g
 
:
As in equilibrium we must have RHSðcÞ ¼ LHSðcÞ; this implies that c < g=½ð1 gÞl þ
g: That is, the intersection between RHSðcÞ and LHSðcÞ occurs for a value of c such that:
c < g½ð1gÞlþg. Therefore, dw=dg > 0.
9.4.3 Evaluating limg!0 w and limg!1 w
In this section, we compute the level of wage in the limit cases where g tends to 0 or 1.





¼ l < 1;
and












¼ l < 1 :



























9.4.4 Change in w with respect to l; l; sI; sD; sD
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9.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Using (26), define the following function,
FðgÞ ¼ 1
q
logwþ c log sI
sD
 





 m ¼ 0:
Since l is set higher than l by default (and it needs to be fulfilled at all times), and both
parameters are bounded from above, to study the effect of changes in spillovers we simply
look at a decrease in l for a given l. This is as if spillovers are (in relative terms) more
























  > 0 :
The denominator of
dg
dl is positive while the numerator is negative and, overall, the effect
is positive.
9.6 Proof of Proposition 6










1gð Þ2þ c1c 1w2
> 0. Since dcdl > 0
and dcdl < 0, then w is positively correlated with l and negatively correlated with l
.
Furthermore, since dcdg > 0 it follows that w is also positively correlated with g.
9.7 Welfare
Using (6), (14), E¼w and E ¼ w ¼ 1; in steady state, the individual lifetime utility in the
North reads












Similarly, for the South, we have












Differentiating the above expressions with respect to l yields (30) and (31) in the main text.
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where 1 < sD < sI ; Q ¼
ð1þÞ½cþlð1cÞdgc
½cþlð1cÞdgcq































dl > 0. Therefore, for
dU









dl > 0, that is the dynamic competition effect outweighs the static






Substituting for 1Q1 ¼
½cþlð1cÞdgcq
½cþlð1cÞdgþcq and g ¼
½cþlð1cÞdgcq
ð1þÞ , we obtain
 >
qð1þ Þc
½cþ lð1 cÞdg qc
 
½cþ lð1 cÞdg cq






½cþ lð1 cÞdg :
This is always satisfied under assumption 1.
9.7.2 Proof that dUdl > 0







































dl > 0. Hence for
dU










dl, that is the gains associated with the re-location of sectors
outweighs the losses associated with the decrease in the relative wage.















































Replacing Q and simplifying












ð1þ Þ½cþ lð1 cÞ
½cþ lð1 cÞ dgc  q
l() cqð1 cÞð1þ Þ½cþ lð1 cÞ
ð1 gÞlf½cþ lð1 cÞdg cqg  1:
Denote by ̂ the solution of the implicit function cqð1cÞð1þ̂Þ½cþlð1cÞ̂ð1gÞlf̂ ½cþlð1cÞdgcqg ¼ 1; then
dU
dl > 0for any   ̂.
9.8 Asymmetries in productivity
Here we postulate d > d (i.e., R&D productivity in the North is greater than in the South)
and l ¼ l < 1. In this case, the condition equalising growth rates (g ¼ g) reads as
dg 1þ lð1 cÞ
c
 
¼ dð1 gÞ 1þ clð1 cÞ
 
:
Accordingly, the location decision of sectors depends on R&D productivity.
It can be easily checked that the left hand side (hereafter LHS) is strictly decreasing, with
limc!0 LHS ¼ þ1 and limc!1 LHS ¼ dg: Similarly, the right hand side (hereafter, RHS) is
strictly increasing, with limc!0 RHS ¼ dð1 gÞ and limc!1 RHS ¼ þ1. Under the as-
sumption 0  dg  1, it follows that there exists a unique solution for c verifying
0  c  1. Notice, also, that dg < 1 is not stringent as g  1 and we can expect d to be
much lower than 1.





 ðd dÞ c
1 c
 
 dl ¼ 0:













ðd dÞ2 þ 4dlðd dÞ
q
2dlþ ðd dÞ þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðd dÞ2 þ 4dlðd dÞ
q :
Furthermore, X> 1=2 if, after some simplifications,ðd dÞþffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðd dÞ2 þ 4dlðd dÞ
q
> 2dl.
Since d > d; we can as well show that ðd dÞ þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðd dÞ2 þ 4dlðd dÞ
q
>
dlþ dl: Simplifying, the latter condition becomes dð1 lÞ  dð1 lÞþffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðd dÞ2 þ 4dlðd dÞ
q
> 0, which is always satisfied. This proves that c > 1=2 when
g ¼ 1=2 as in the case analysed in the main section of the paper.
Finally, by applying the implicit function theorem, it can be easily checked that dcdd < 0.
Therefore, the properties of the model described for l apply to d.
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9.9 Intra-regional equilibrium under heterogeneity and population growth













The first order conditions are given by: @CVHqj;t=@Xqj;t ¼ 0; @CVHqj;t=@LAqj;t ¼ 0 and











The zero profit condition reads as
wtLXqj;t
ð1 Xqj;t=Xj;tÞ












Equations giving the relation between the amounts of labour allocated to the production of
varieties, LXt , to R&D, L
A
t , and the number of firms in each sector, Q, are respectively
QLXt
ðQ 1Þ  L
X
t  LAt ¼ 0;










Then, we can compute the number of sectors located in the North, c, the number of firms
in each sector, Q, and the steady-state growth rate, g, respectively
































































































It is worth emphasising here that the equation is exactly the same as in the main text, al-
though we should keep in mind that c now depends on the relative average amount of know-
ledge between regions, At=A

t  H. Equally, the comparative statics identified in section 9.3
retain the same signs, as shown below.
9.9.1 Comparative statics



























































¼  cð1 cÞ
H
< 0:
Note that dcdH < 0 is consistent with the assumption of decreasing returns to innovation,
implying that an increase in average knowledge in the North relative to the South makes the
advanced region relative less productive at producing new knowledge and, thereby, a relatively
less attractive location for firms. This also implies that, c > g might not be satisfied if the dif-
ference in average knowledge between regions is large enough. To rule out such a case, we im-
pose the following restriction:
 12gþ2gl 1H½ þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
12gþ2lg 1H½ 2þ4lg 1H ð1gÞlHð12gÞgl 1H½ 
q
2 ð1gÞlHð12gÞgl 1H½ 
> g,
which is fulfilled for H not too large.
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Moving on to the effect on the equilibrium number of firms, recall that a change in Q with









































h i2 < 0. Accordingly,





























































1þ l ð1cÞc 1H
h i
 ðq xÞ


















cþ lð1 cÞ 1H
 
 ðq xÞ
h i2 cð1 cÞH þ dcdH
 
¼ 0;
since dcdH ¼ 
cð1cÞ
H . Note that, firms’ heterogeneity has no impact on the number of firms
within each sector. Two effects cancel each other out: The positive direct effect from the
change in relative average knowledge between regions (captured by the term in H) is offset
by the negative indirect effect coming from the relocation of sectors (captured by dcdH).

















cþ lð1 cÞ 1H
 
 ðq xÞ

































































And, differentiating dgdl above with respect to H, we obtain:


































9.9.2 Effects on DU
To assess whether a change in H mitigates or reinforces the effect of lon the utility differen-
tial, DU , we need first to look at the effect on the relative wage between regions. Applying



































































































































































dl derived earlier, and simplifying, we obtain

























 2 dwdl > 0:





































































We know that d
2c
dldH < 0 and
dw











> 0: First, recall that cð1cÞ >
g
1g because c > g > 1=2:




g > 1 and
dw
dsD


















< 0 which is always verified. Next, let us show that cwð1cÞ
sI
sD
 g1g > 0.


























w2. Plugging the lat-
ter into the inequality ( cwð1cÞ
sI
sD




















As Peretto (2003), we study the effects of demographic shocks on growth and market struc-
ture. I.e. we analyse how variables vary when the population growth rate, x, varies.
Impact on c
Inspection of (A.11) implies that any demographic shock (i.e. a change in population
growth x) has no impact on c: Given that c depends on g, this result is of course due to the
fact that population growth is common to both regions.
Impact on Q
From equation (A.12), we have

































A greater population growth leads to a reduction of firms in each sector, i.e. less competition.
Impact on LAt =L
w
t





As population growth increases, firms allocate a greater share of their workforce to R&D.
Impact on g
From equation (A.13), we obtain dgdx > 0. A greater population growth leads to a higher
level of growth.
Spatial equilibrium
Note that wage does not depend on population growth: dw=dx ¼ 0. Therefore, from
(A.14), we directly conclude that there is no impact of a demographic shock on the spatial
equilibrium.
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Miguélez, E. and Moreno, R. (2015). Knowledge flows and the absorptive capacity of regions.
Research Policy, 44(4):833–848.
Minerva, G. and Ottaviano, G. I. P. (2009). Endogenous growth theory: agglomeration benefits and
transportation costs. In P., Nijkamp and R., Capello, editors, Handbook of Regional Growth and
Development Theories. Edward Elgar.
Murata, Y. (2003). Product diversity, taste heterogeneity, and geographic distribution of economic
activities:: market vs. non-market interactions. Journal of Urban Economics, 53(1):126–144.
Neary, J. P. (2016). International trade in general oligopolistic equilibrium. Review of International
Economics, 24(4):669–698.
Ottaviano, G. I. and Robert-Nicoud, F. (2005). The ‘genome’of neg models with vertical linkages: a
positive and normative synthesis. Journal of Economic Geography, 6(2):113–139.
Peretto, P. F. (1996). Sunk costs, market structure, and growth. International Economic Review,
37(4):895–923.
Peretto, P. F. (1998). Technological change and population growth. Journal of Economic Growth,
3(4):283–311.
Peretto, P. F. (2003). Endogenous market structure, and the growth and welfare effects of economic
integration. Journal of International Economics, 60(1):177—201.
Peretto, P. F. and Connolly, M. (2007). The manhattan metaphor. Journal of Economic Growth,
12(4):329–350.
Redding, S. J. (2011). Economic geography: a review of the theoretical and empirical literature. In
D., Bernhofen, R., Falvey, D., Greenaway, and U., Kreickemeier, editors, The Palgrave Handbook
of International Trade. Palgrave Macmillan.
Rossi-Hansberg, E., Sarte, P.-D., and Trachter, N. (2018). Diverging Trends in National and Local
Concentration. Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Smulders, S. and Van de Klundert, T. (1995). Imperfect competition, concentration and growth with
firm-specific r & d. European Economic Review, 39(1):139–160.
Spence, M. (1984). Cost reduction, competition, and industry performance. Econometrica, 52(1):
101–122.
Tabuchi, T., Thisse, J. F., and Zhu, X. (2018). Does technological progress magnify regional dispar-
ities? International Economic Review, 59:647 – 663.
Thompson, P. and Fox-Kean, M. (2005). Patent citations and the geography of knowledge spillovers:
a reassessment. American Economic Review, 95(1):450–460.






/joeg/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeg/lbab019/6375387 by guest on 06 O
ctober 2021
